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STOPPING SCIENCE: THE CASE OF
CRYPTOGRAPHY
David Banisar*
SINCE THE END OF WORLD WAR II, the United States
government has attempted to limit the development and availabil-
ity of publicly available cryptography in order to preserve and en-
hance its ability to monitor communications anywhere in the
world. This effort had been led by the super-secretive National
Security Agency (NSA). In the last decade, it has been aided by
the Department of Justice and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
which has taken the lead in arguing for new laws restricting do-
mestic development and use. Together the agencies have been suc-
cessful in setting government policy towards surveillance in the
face of Congressional and public opposition. To limit cryptogra-
phy, the agencies have lobbied for new laws, subverted standards
processes, threatened academic and private cryptographers, used
export control laws to influence domestic policy, and lobbied other
governments and international organizations to create international
restrictions. They have also eliminated or co-opted other agencies
who are authorized to operate in this field. As computers and net-
works have become an essential part of modern life, this battle has
become a major public policy issue.
By one measure, their actions have been successful - thus far,
they have been able to delay the widespread adoption of encryp-
tion for over twenty years. However, the effectiveness of their
powers are ending. Due to the Internet, demand for cryptography
to protect privacy and ensure security has exploded while distribu-
tion using the Internet has made it possible to send or receive
strong cryptography from nearly anywhere in the world in seconds.
t The Author is an attorney in the Washington, D.C. area, specializing in pri-
vacy and freedom of information law. He is a senior fellow at the Electronic Privacy
Information Center (http://www.epic.org) in Washington, D.C. and Deputy Director
of Privacy International (http://www.privacyinternational.org). He is co-author, with
Bruce Schneier, of THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS: DOCUMENTS ON THE BATrLE
FOR PRIVACY IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE (John Wiley & Sons, 1997). He is a 1993
graduate of The Columbus School of Law, the Catholic University of America and is
a member of the Maryland Bar. Some portions-of this Article previously appeared in
THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS.
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In the past few years, many foreign companies have sprung up.
American companies and independent researchers are developing
and making available new programs each day. Other governments
have rejected the U.S. approach and are relaxing controls. The in-
ternational consensus is now against the United States.
I. WHAT IS CRYPTOGRAPHY?
Cryptography provides a means of accomplishing two crucial
functions - encryption and authentication. Encryption is the proc-
ess of encoding or "scrambling" the contents of any data or voice
communication with an algorithm (a mathematical formula) and a
randomly selected variable associated with the algorithm, known
as a "key." Only the intended recipient of the communication, who
holds the key, can decrypt and access the information. The key is
essentially a string of numbers; the longer the string, the stronger
the security. 1
The authentication capabilities of cryptographic systems in-
volve the use of "digital signatures." A digital signature is a cryp-
tographically based assurance that a particular document was cre-
ated or transmitted by a given person. It thus provides a means of
authenticating the integrity of electronically transmitted data and
the identity of the sender, much as a handwritten signature verifies
the authenticity of a paper record. Digital signatures also provide
for the "non-repudiation" of electronic data - the inability to deny
the authenticity of the transmitted information. As the world
moves toward increased reliance on electronic communications,
the importance of such capabilities is apparent.
Emerging computer and communications technologies are
radically altering the ways in which we communicate and ex-
change information. Along with the speed, efficiency, and cost-
saving benefits of the "digital revolution" come new challenges
to the security and privacy of communications and information
traversing the global communications infrastructure. As the Na-
tional Research Council's Committee to Study Cryptography
Policy (NRC Committee) noted, the threat to personal privacy is
substantial:
1 The Author would like to thank David L. Sobel of EPIC for providing this
section. See generally BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY (2d ed. 1996) (ex-
plaining the function of the "key" in cryptography). See, e.g., Philip R. Zimmermann,
Cryptography for the Internet, Sci. Am., Oct. 1998, at 110 (describing the lack of
privacy in electronically sent information and how well-designed cryptography sys-
tems can provide better protection).
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Increasing reliance on electronic commerce and the use of
networked communication for all manner of activities sug-
gest that more information about more people will be
stored in network-accessible systems and will be commu-
nicated more broadly and more often, thus raising ques-
tions about the security of that information.
Communication and information stored and transmitted by
computers can be protected against interception through the use of
cryptographic security techniques. Electronic communications are
now widely used in the civilian sector and have become an integral
component of the global economy. Computers store and exchange
an ever-increasing amount of highly personal information, includ-
ing medical and financial data. Communications applications such
as electronic mail and electronic fund transfers require secure
means of encryption and authentication - features that can only be
provided if cryptographic technology is widely available and un-
encumbered by government regulation.
II. STRATEGY 1: SUPPRESSION AND CONTROL
The NSA has long attempted to suppress discussion, devel-
opment, and dissemination of encryption. It has used various tac-
tics including intimidating academic researchers, misapplying
laws, eliminating research funding and competing government
agencies, and pressing for legislation that would ban its use.
The NSA has long opposed discussing cryptography. This is
perhaps best exemplified in a 1992 letter opposing a proposal for
hearings on cryptography: "[T]he National Security Agency has
serious reservations about a public debate on cryptography."
3
A. Born Classified
Over the past half-century in the United States, there has been
an ongoing debate about military efforts to control the dissemina-
tion of unclassified technical, scientific, and economic informa-
tion, including cryptography. The military and intelligence com-
2 National Research Council, Cryptography's Role in Securing the Information
Society, at 41 (Kenneth W. Dam & Herbert S. Lin eds., 1996) [hereinafter NRC Re-
port] (explaining individual and personal interests in privacy in the information age).
3 Letter from J.M. McConnell, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director of National
Security Agency, to Willis H. Ware, Chairman, National Computer System Security
and Privacy Advisory Board (July 23, 1992) (on file with Author) (establishing the
NSA's concern that public debate over cryptography will jeopardize national security
interests).
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munity has tried to control this information, arguing that its dis-
semination threatens the national security.4 In opposition, the sci-
entific community has argued that there must be a free flow of in-
formation to promote scientific inquiry and that the military should
not have the power to determine what should be publicly available.
As Congressman Jack Brooks noted in 1966:
Since it is a natural tendency of DOD [the Department of
Defense] to classify everything, it would be impossible for
the department to strike an objective balance between the
need to safeguard information and the need to maintain the
free exchange of information.
As computers became more commonplace in the 1970s, aca-
demic and corporate interest in encryption strongly increased. Pro-
grams in encryption and computer security as a specialty of com-
puter science sprang up at universities across the United States.
These programs were spurred by the growing realization of the
need to protect the massive amount of personal and proprietary
information that was being computerized. This rapid increase in
public interest did not go unnoticed by the NSA. Under the leader-
ship of Director Bobby Ray Inman, the NSA began efforts to limit
public development and dissemination of encryption.
One of its first targets was the funding of academic research.
NSA employees began suggesting to their National Science Foun-
dation (NSF) counterparts that the NSA had exclusive control over
the funding of encryption research. In 1977, the NSA directly ap-
proached Fred Weingarten, Director of the Division of Computer
Research of the NSF, and told him that federal law gave NSA
complete control over cryptography. Weingarten, after consulting
with NSF's lawyers, challenged the NSA's claim. The NSA
backed off, offering to "review" NSF grant proposals. The NSF
agreed, with the stipulation that the NSA would only review the
technical merits of the proposals.
In 1978, the NSA tried a different strategy. It began aggres-
sively using the 1951 Invention Secrecy Act5 to attempt to classify
cryptography products that were designed by non-government re-
4 See, e.g., Harold C. Relyea, Silencing Science: National Security Controls
and Scientific Communication (1994) (discussing how the rapid development of sci-
ence has caused an increase in the availability of various types of information and
how various groups struggle for control over such information).
' 35 U.S.C. §§ 181-88 (1994) (establishing the government policy and proce-
dures for denying access to inventories viewed as posing national security risks, as
well as setting penalties for violating the stated policy).
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searchers. Previously, the Act had only been applied to govern-
ment researchers and those who had signed secrecy orders prior to
conducting research. The Act allows the Patent Office to forward
applications to government agencies which have an interest in the
subject area. The agencies can then classify the proposal if they
determine that it threatens national security. The person who re-
ceives the note is ordered not to discuss the patent again. Violators
can be fined $10,000, and imprisoned for two years.
The first targets who went public were Professor George Da-
vida of the University of Wisconsin and free-lance researcher Carl
Nicolai. They had both filed for patents on encryption devices.
Nicolal had created a simple analog voice encryption device that
he planned to sell for $100. Davida had developed an encryption
device for the high speed encryption of networks. After the classi-
fications were made public, the NSA rescinded the orders, calling
them "mistakes."
At the same time it was cracking down on outside research, the
NSA also worked to limit any competition from inside the gov-
ernment. In 1977, President Carter signed Presidential Direc-
tive/NSC 24 (PD-24) to improve telecommunications protections
for government-derived, unclassified information which may be of
value to a foreign adversary after revelations that Soviet agents
were eavesdropping on major U.S. telephone links, including
Washington and New York.6 The Directive appointed the Defense
Department to protect "government-derived classified information
and government-derived unclassified information which relates to
national security" while the Commerce Department was assigned
the task of protecting "government-derived unclassified informa-
tion," and assisting the private sector with protecting its informa-
tion. But when a division of the Department of Commerce began
to investigate public cryptography, NSA Director Inman began to
attack because he "perceived an unwillingness on the part of the
[Commerce Department] to 'recognize the legitimate role of
NSA.' ' '7 He began to push for the elimination of Commerce's role
and the merging of classified and unclassified measures under the
control of the NSA. Eventually, after intense lobbying from Inman,
6 See David Burnham, New Unit Seeks to Prevent Russians from Spying on U.S.
Phone System, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1979, at A16 (explaining that the Special Proj-
ect Division was created to encourage businesses and federal agencies to protect in-
formation that could be useful to a potential enemy).
7 George F. Jelen, Information Security. An Elusive Goal, 1985 PROGRAM ON
INFO. REsouRcEs POL'Y II-64 (discussing the unwillingness of the Commerce De-
partment to admit that national security concerns existed).
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funding was cut drastically in 1982, and the Commerce Depart-
ment's Special Projects Division that was in charge of civilian
computer security was eliminated.
In 1979, Inman began a public campaign to promote restric-
tions. At the Armed Forces Communications Electronics Associa-
tion conference, Inman gave the first-ever public speech by an
NSA Director. He called encryption dangerous and called for
limitations on the public dissemination of encryption saying,
"there is a very real and critical danger that unrestrained public
discussion of cryptographic matters will seriously damage the
ability of the government to conduct signals intelligence."8 He de-
manded that an "accommodation" must be reached with the NSA
over private sector research and development in cryptography. Fi-
nally, Inman called for limitations on other types of technical data.
Inman's efforts were quickly criticized by the scientific com-
munity. The American Association for the Advancement of Sci-
ence (AAAS) passed a resolution condemning the restrictions:
Whereas freedom and national security are best preserved
by adherence to the principles of openness that are a fun-
damental tenet of both American society and the scientific
process, be it resolved that the AAAS opposes govern-
mental restrictions on the dissemination, exchange, or
availability of unclassified knowledge.9
Inman followed this up by asking the American Council on Edu-
cation, an association representing 1400 universities in the United
States, to create a Public Cryptography Study Group in 1983 to
examine the issue of limits on academic research of encryption.
Inman asked the panel to review the "acceptability of restric-
tions on domestic dissemination of non-governmental technical
information relating to cryptography."'" The panel rejected the
suggestion. Instead, it voted to recommend that researchers vol-
untarily provide their research to the NSA. Today, almost no
cryptographers except those with relationships with NSA submit
their papers.
8 For text of the Inman speech, see BRUCE SCHNEIER & DAVID BANISAR,
THE ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS: DOCUMENTS ON THE BATTLE FOR PRIVACY IN
THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 297 (1997) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC PRIVACY
PAPERS].
9 Id.
10 Id.
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B. NSDD-145: The National Security Information State
With the election of Ronald Reagan in November 1980, the
debate over controls on scientific information intensified. The new
administration favored restricted access to information. As part of
that effort, the NSA began to push again to take over computer
security and encryption.
In April 1982, President Reagan signed Executive Order
12,356 on the classification of national security information. It
eliminated the requirement that there be balancing of national se-
curity and public interests before information could be classified.
In 1984, Reagan approved National Security Decision Directive
NSDD-145, which expanded the security classification system to
include "sensitive, but unclassified data.""1 The term was broadly
defined as "information the disclosure, loss, misuse, alternation, or
destruction that could adversely affect national security or other
Federal Government interests."' 2 The directive was based on the
assumption that aggregating unclassified information could affect
national security and, therefore, those systems should be controlled
by the military.
NSDD-145 gave the NSA broad authority over computer se-
curity, including cryptography. A 1992 internal NSA memoran-
dum bluntly stated: "In 1984, NSA engineered a National Security
Decision Directive, NSDD-145, through the Reagan Administra-
tion that gave responsibility for the security of all U.S. information
systems to the Director of NSA, removing NBS from this. 13 The
NSA was appointed to "act as the government focal point for
cryptography, telecommunications systems security, and auto-
mated information system security. . . to conduct, approve or en-
dorse research" and to "review and approve all standards, tech-
niques, systems and equipment."' 14 It was given authority to "pre-
scribe the minimum standards, methods and procedures for pro-
"1 NSDD-145 Sept. 1984, National Policy on Telecommunications and Auto-
mated Information Systems Security (replaced by NSD-42, National Policy for the
Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems (U) July
5, 1990).
12 SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 299.
13 Memorandum from Clinton C. Brooks, Special Assistant to the Director of
the National Security Agency (Apr. 28, 1992), available at NSDD-145 and the Com-
puter Security Act (visited Mar. 14, 1999) <http:/www.epic.orglcrypto/csalbrooks
.gif> (discussing a bill proposed by then-Chairman of the House Government Opera-
tions Committee, Rep. Jack Brooks, to reassert the responsibility of the National
Bureau of Standards (NBS) in this area).
14 ScHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 299.
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tecting cryptographic and other sensitive technical security mate-
rial, techniques, and information.' Using these broad grants of
authority, the NSA and other intelligence agencies attempted to
expand their control over security and access to nonmilitary com-
puter systems, both within the federal government and in the pri-
vate sector.
In 1986, National Security Advisor Admiral John Poindexter
issued an additional directive, NTISSP 2, extending the scope of
NSDD-145 to include even more information. 16 The definition of
information under its jurisdiction was extraordinarily broad:
Sensitive, but unclassified information is information the
disclosure, loss, misuse, alteration, or destruction of which
could adversely affect national security or other Federal
Government interests. National security interests are those
unclassified matters that relate to the national defense or
the foreign relations of the U.S. Government. Other gov-
ernment interests are those related, but not limited to the
wide range of government or government-derived eco-
nomic, human, financial, industrial, agricultural, techno-
logical, and law enforcement information, as well as the
privacy or confidentiality of personal or commercial pro-
prietary information provided to the U.S. Government by
its citizens.
17
The two directives together were used as authority for the
NSA and the CIA to visit private companies and organizations that
held "sensitive" information, including LEXIS/NEXIS, DIALOG,
CompuServe, and banks. Mead, which owned LEXIS/NEXIS at
the time, eventually purged from its system all the technical data
obtained from the National Technical Information Service because
of the visits. The directive was also reportedly used to justify an
NSA investigation of the computer software used to count votes in
the 1984 Presidential election.
By 1984, many members of Congress believed that legislative
action would be necessary to resolve the conflict between the ef-
forts of the military and the NSA to restrict information and the
15 Id.
16 National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, but Unclassified Information in
Federal Government Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems
(NTISSP 2) (Oct. 29, 1986), reprinted in SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 367-70 (stating the manner in which sensitive in-
formation should be handled by federal departments and agencies).
17 Id at 368.
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civilian interest in the free flow of information. House Govern-
ment Operations Chairman Jack Brooks expressed the sentiment of
the Congress in his opening statement to hearings held in 1987:
"these actions reflect an unprecedented expansion of the military's
influence into our society, which is unhealthy politically and po-
tentially very dangerous."
18
After several unsuccessful attempts at passage, and against
strong lobbying by the NSA, Congress enacted the Computer Se-
curity Act of 1987.19 The Congress made clear its intent that there
should be a separation of authority for classified and unclassified
information security, including cryptography. The House Science,
Space, and Technology Committee report noted that "the Com-
mittee felt it is important to pursue a legislative remedy to estab-
lish a civilian authority to develop standards relating to sensitive,
but unclassified data."20 The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) (formerly the National Bureau of Standards
(NBS)), a division of the Department of Commerce, was given
"responsibility within the federal government for the developing of
technical, management, physical, and administrative standards and
guidelines for the cost-effective security and privacy of sensitive
information in federal computer systems.""1 NBS was allowed to
request technical assistance from NSA, at the discretion of the
NBS.
With the enactment of the Computer Security Act, NSA again
faced a challenge to its control over computer security and cryp-
tography. Shortly after the law went into effect, NSA began efforts
to undermine it with the support of NIST leadership. In March
1989, NIST Acting Director Raymond Kammer signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding with NSA which delegated to NSA
18 Computer Security Act of 1987, Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations, 100th Cong. 2 (1987) (statement of Jack
Brooks, Chairman, House Government Operations) (suggesting that the balance be-
tween the need to protect national security and the need to pursue advanced tech-
nologies would be better determined via public hearings).
'9 Computer Security Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-235, 101 Stat. 1724 (1988)
(codified with some differences in language at 15 U.S.C. § 2789-3, 4 (1997) (estab-
lishing a computer standards program, government-wide computer security, and
training for those in security matters) [hereinafter CSA].
20 H.R. REP. No. 100-153(), at 22 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3120, 3137 (reporting favorably on and recommending a bill providing for a com-
puter standards program within the NBS, government-wide computer security, and
training in security matters for those involved with federal computer systems).
21 SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at
1999]
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many of the responsibilities that Congress had assigned to NIST
once again placing NSA in the dominant role in setting standards.22
The General Accounting Office testified in 1989 that:
The document as a whole . . . allows such prerogatives to
NSA as it seems to me go a long way towards nullifying
any initiative that NIST might undertake to which NSA
would at the same time object .... The memo to me does
not project the full sense that it is NSA that will be respon-
sive to NIST. Rather, it suggests that where there is any
disagreement between NIST and NSA, that it will be NSA
that keeps its hands on the levers of control.2 3
These concerns were later shown to be prophetic.
24
C. "Operation Root Canal": The FBI Joins the Fight
In 1991, the FBI joined the campaign to limit cryptography.
The FBI convinced Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) and Congress-
man Tom Lantos (D-CA) to introduce a "Sense of Congress" pro-
vision into several pending bills that encouraged telephone compa-
nies to provide law enforcement officials with the decrypted copies
of encrypted communications of their subscribers72 In his remarks
for the Congressional Record, Senator Biden described the purpose
of the provision: "[I]t encourages electronic communications
equipment providers to design such equipment to allow law en-
22 Memorandum of Understanding Between the Director of the National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology and the Director of the National Security Agency
Concerning the Implementation of Public Law 100-235 (Mar. 1989), available in
Memorandum of Understanding (Mar. 1989) (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.epic.
org/crypto/csa/nist_nsamou.html>. See also SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC
PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 302-03.
23 Military and Civilian Control of Civilian Computer Security Issues: Hearing
Before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations, 101st Cong. 37-38 (1989) (statement of Milton J.
Scolar, Special Assistant to the Comptroller General, U.S. General Accounting Of-
fice) (discussing the issue of "the degree to which the responsibilities vested in the
NIST under the act [were being subverted] by the role assigned to the NSA under the
Memorandum").
24 See Strategy 2: Subverting Standards, infra § III.
2 The provision stated that "[iut is the sense of Congress that providers of elec-
tronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications
service equipment shall ensure that communications systems permit the government
to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when ap-
propriately authorized by law." Comprehensive Counterterrorism Improvement Act
of 1991, S. 266, 102d Cong., § 2210 (1991). See also SCHNEIER & BANISAR,
ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 308.
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forcement agencies, when duly authorized by law, to more easily
conduct surveillance activities. 26
Industry and civil liberties groups strongly and publicly op-
posed this proposal, arguing that it would have limited the devel-
opment and dissemination of cryptography and force telephone
companies to act as agents of the FBI. The provision was with-
drawn in June 1991.27
At this point, the NSA began assisting the FBI with its efforts
to enact legislation banning communications systems that did not
have built-in surveillance capabilities. A September 1991 memo
from the Justice Department described the objective as: "[t]o ob-
tain approval of a strategy and legislation which will enable law
enforcement real-time access to communications, whether en-
crypted or not.",28 This project was code-named "Operation Root
Canal" by the FBI.
The early drafts of the digital wiretap legislation banned the
use of any encryption not approved by NIST. A July 1991 memo
described the new procedures as "[d]irect[ing] NIST to develop its
standards under the Computer Security Act and other standards
which for the first time would apply to the private sector... to be
consistent with the objectives of this Act." 29 A later draft required
that all encryption products be registered with the Federal Com-
munications Commission and meet standards established by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology "as a condition for
use in connection with a communications system or service oper-
ated in the United States.
30
In late 1991, the Department of Justice (DOJ), the NSA, and
the CIA met to discuss legislative proposals, including encryption.
They agreed that the encryption provisions were "controversial"
26 137 CONG. REc. S1190, S1191 (daily ed. Jan. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Biden) (introducing S. 266, the Comprehensive Counterterrorism Act of 1991, pro-
viding a detailed fact sheet containing section-by-section analysis of the bill).
See SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 139
(discussing a provision which encouraged telephone companies "to provide greater
assistance to law encryption-related problems").
28 Memorandum from Dan Levin, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the
Deputy Attorney General, to Kier Boyd et al. (Sept. 2, 1991), available in 1996 EPIC
CRYPTOGRAPHY AND PRIVACY SOURCEBOOK, at C-5 (1996) (providing meeting notes
discussing the objective of obtaining approval of a strategy which will enable law-en-
forcement real-time access to communications).
29 Memorandum on Communications and Law Enforcement Legislation (July 8,
1991) (on file with Author) (providing draft legislation entitled "Communication and
Law Enforcement Act").
30 Memorandum on Digital Wiretap Legislation (Jan. 31, 1992) (on file with
Author) (providing a draft of untitled legislation).
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and would have to wait for another year. 31 In December 1991, Na-
tional Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft submitted a memo to
President George Bush recommending that he approve the digital
wiretap proposal.32 A month later, Bush approved the plan. In a
memo sent to Secretary of Defense Dick Chaney, Attorney General
Barr, and CIA Director Gates, Scowcroft noted that, "[s]uccess
with digital telephony will lock in one major objective; we will
have a beachhead we can exploit for the encryption fix; and the
encryption access options can be developed more thoroughly in the
meantime (TS). 33
In June 1992, an interagency group made up of the FBI, NSA
and NIST was set up at the request of the FBI Director.34 The FBI
pushed to develop a "national cryptography policy. ' 35 By this time,
the agencies recognized that banning encryption was politically
volatile, "[alll parties deemed this alternative not to be a viable
approach. '36 At a July meeting, the group agreed that more infor-
mation was necessary to develop a policy.37 A NIST representative
who wrote up a summary of the meeting recognized that the FBI's
desires for monitoring were problematic, writing, "[m]ore infor-
mation [is necessary] on the FBI's 'real time' requirement. The
closer 'real time' becomes to instantaneous, the more draconian
and intrusive the solution becomes. 38
The FBI, the DOJ, and the NSA pushed hard for a ban on
other forms of encryption. In a briefing document sent to the Na-
tional Security Council in February 1993, the FBI, the NSA, and
the DOJ argued that:
Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if
they are incorporated into all encryption products. To en-
31 SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 309.
32 Id.
33 Memorandum from Brent Scowcroft, National Security Advisor, to Dick
Cheney, Secretary of Defense et al. (Jan. 17, 1991). Id. at 160.
34 See Lynn McNulty, Memorandum for the Record (Aug. 18, 1992), available
in 1996 EPIC CRYPTOGRPAPHY AND PRIVACY SOURCEBOOK, at C-14 (summarizing
the July 1992 meetings of the interagency group created to develop a national en-
cryption policy).
35 Id. (developing a framework policy that would serve the public interest in
general cryptographic security while protecting national security and law enforce-
ment).
36 Id. at C-17 (finding that the government must recognize the need for commer-
cial encryption technology).
37 See id. at C-18 (discussing the areas in which additional information is needed
before conclusions can be drawn).
38 Id. at C-19.
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sure that this occurs, legislation mandating the use of
Government-approved encryption products or adherence to
Government encryption criteria is required.3
Another FBI memo argued that, "[a] national policy embodied
in legislation is needed which ... [i]nsures cryptographic devices
and systems... [which] are capable of real-time decryption by law
enforcement ... [and] [p]rohibits cryptography that cannot meet
the Government standard. ' '4°
The panel presented its conclusions to the President, Vice-
President, and the National Security Council in a report issued in
late November 1993. At that point, the National Security Council
rejected the banning of encryption as being politically unfeasible.
Behind the scenes, however, the FBI continued to develop
legislation to require that all encryption systems be readable by the
government. Starting in March 1995, FBI Director Louis Freeh
began meeting with members of Congress and testified before sev-
eral Congressional committees to discuss how the "encryption
problem" had to be solved. After the Oklahoma City bombing,42
Freeh stepped up his efforts even more and began publicly calling
for restrictions on the use of encryption, groundlessly claiming that
the Oklahoma City bombing could have been stopped, even though
none of the suspects was under surveillance prior to the incident
and none used encryption.
Reporter Brock Meeks wrote in May 1995 that draft legislation
39 ScHNEiER & BAmNSAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 311.
See also Encryption: The Threat, Applications and Potential Solutions (visited Mar.
3, 1999) <http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi-dox/mandatory.gif> (showing scanned
copy of the briefing document provided to the National Security Council).
40 Federal Bureau of Investigation, Impact of Emerging Telecommunications
Technologies on Law Enforcement (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.epic.org/ cryp-
to/banfbi-dox/impacLtext.gif> (encouraging legislation to control domestic encryp-
tion products by ensuring that law enforcement will have decryption capabilities,
while affording protection to legitimate users).
41 See Nationalize an Industry (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.us.net/softwar
/nsa.html> (containing a brief, entitled Impacts of Telecommunications and Encryp-
tion Technology on Law Enforcement and Intelligence Collection: Assessment, Op-
tions, and Recommendations, which discusses the design of "a microelectronics chip
that would provide high quality encryption while still enabling government decryp-
tion" and maintains that the encryption chip is "only a partial solution" to the privacy
issue).
42 On April 19, 1995, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols, both subsequently
tried and convicted, detonated a bomb outside the Murrah Federal Building in
downtown Oklahoma City killing 169 men, women, and children.
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was being proposed to require key escrow.43 Meeks cited a draft pro-
posal which was floated in March, describing a strategy to eliminate
competition by mandating all systems be certified before use.' Meeks
quoted one government official as admitting the difficulty in intro-
ducing the proposal to the public: "We all know what a bitch this is
going to be trying to sell it to the selling public." Following that
lead, in June 1995, Senator Charles Grassley introduced a bill to re-
strict access to encryption software on the Internet and promoted
weakened forms of encryption by making it unlawful to "distribute
computer software that encodes or encrypts electronic or digital
communications to computer networks that the person distributing the
software knows or reasonably should know, is accessible to foreign
nationals and foreign governments" unless the program "used a uni-
versal decoding device or program that was provided to the Depart-
ment of Justice prior to the distribution. '" 6 Industry and public interest
groups overwhelmingly criticized the bill. Even the Justice Depart-
ment withdrew its support of the measure, claiming that it had noth-
ing to do with its introduction.
In September 1997, the FBI tried again. Several Congressional
committees approved a law that would have relaxed the export
controls on encryption. At the behest of the law enforcement and
intelligence agencies, two committees, the House Intelligence
Committee and the House National Security Committee, approved
amendments that would ban the use of encryption in the United
States without government approval. The agencies also put heavy
pressure on the House Commerce Committee to approve a similar
amendment. There was a furious scramble as phone companies,
computer companies, civil liberties groups, and the public lobbied
the Committee to reject the amendment after it appeared that it
would be approved. The Committee reversed its support and ap-
proved the bill without the amendment. The bill later died in the
House Committee because of pressure by the FBI on House Rules
Committee Chairman Gerald Solomon.
So far, attempts to take over the field of encryption or ban
encryption that cannot be decrypted by government agencies have
43 Brock N. Meeks, Jacking in From the Narco-Terrorist Encryption Port (vis-
ited Apr. 9, 1999) <http://www.epic.org/crypto/ban/cyberwire.html> (admonishing
the government for legislation banning private encryption).
4Id.
4 id.
46 The Anti-Electronic Racketeering Act of 1995, S. 974, 104th Cong. § 1030A
(banning certain acts involving computers in the furtherance of crimes and providing
an affirmative defense to prosecution).
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been unsuccessful because of public opposition. Ironically, many
of their attempts have had a reverse effect, with the controversy
generating more interest in the issue and causing more develop-
ment of encryption devices rather than less.
1Il. STRATEGY 2: SUBVERTING STANDARDS
A second strategy to limit cryptography has been the efforts
of the NSA and FBI to manipulate the development of technical
standards to facilitate their demands for surveillance. They have
successfully controlled normally independent and open govern-
ment standards-setting bodies. Traditionally, standards developed
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology are devel-
oped in an open and public process which allows for full public
comment and input. Interested parties in government, industry, and
academia submit proposals and comments. NIST acts as an inde-
pendent arbitrator choosing the best system and making it a stan-
dard that can then be used by all. Open standards are considered
very important in the telecommunications and computer field so
that the standard will be acceptable to those who must adopt it.
Secrecy may also undermine the security of the mechanism. Under
traditional standards setting procedures for computer security, a
standard is made public so that a large number of researchers are
able to examine it for flaws using different approaches. In 1993,
the General Accounting Office determined that, "[a]lthough the
Computer Security Act of 1987 reaffirmed NIST's responsibility
for developing federal information-processing standards for the
security of sensitive, unclassified information, NIST follows
NSA's lead in developing certain cryptographic standards."'47
A. The Data Encryption Standard
The NSA's efforts to interfere with the standards process be-
gan with the development of the first public government encryp-
tion standard, the Data Encryption Standard (DES). In 1972, the
National Bureau of Standards, after several years of study, decided
to create a new encryption standard for protecting unclassified
government information which could also be used by the private
47 Communications Privacy - Federal Policy and Actions, GAO/OSI-94-2, 3
(Nov. 1993), also available at Communications Privacy - Federal Policy and Ac-
tions (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http:/www.epic.orglcryptolreportslGAOcomm_
privacy.html>, at 2 (discussing government roles in maintaining encryption programs
developed to combat economic espionage).
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sector.
IBM submitted its Lucifer algorithm, a symmetric key en-
cryption system with a 128-bit key that was already being used by
Lloyds Bank in its networks.48 At the insistence of the NSA, IBM
reduced the key size by over half to fifty-six bits and also revised
some of the internal workings, known as the "S-Boxes." The NSA
changes prompted a public debate about the role of the NSA in
developing the standard. In response to public criticism, the NSA
issued a terse written statement which said, "IBM designed the
algorithm. NSA evaluated the algorithm for the NBS. Key length
is adequate for the application."
In July 1977, NBS formally adopted the modified Lucifer al-
gorithm as the official U.S. Data Encryption Standard (DES).49
From the perspective of the NSA, the controversy must have been
considered successful. The controversy discouraged many compa-
nies from adopting the standard. Many including CitiBank and
Banker's Trust opted for propriety standards. The reduction of the
key size also reduced the future use of the DES.
Not satisfied with weakening the DES, the NSA began to dis-
courage publicly its use a few years later. In a 1986 letter to the
NBS, the NSA stated that the widespread use of DES "could moti-
vate a hostile intelligence organization to mount a large scale" at-
tack and recommended that it only be used for financial services. 50
As a suggested replacement, the NSA announced two programs for
manufacturers to develop NSA-certified cryptography in which the
NSA would provide secret algorithms in tamper-proof chips to
"approved companies" that implemented them into larger systems.
Industry organizations strongly opposed this effort because
they feared handing over too much control of their banking and
communications networks to the NSA. It was widely assumed that
if the NSA built these systems, it would be able to read all com-
munications that used them. In addition, because of the classified
algorithms, there were severe limitations on the use of the devices.
They could not be used outside the United States, which posed a
48 A symmetric key encryption system is one that requires the same key to
encrypt and decrypt.
49 See generally Encryption Algorithm for Computer Data Protection, 40 Fed.
Reg. 12,134 (1975) (describing accepted encryption algorithm and soliciting com-
ments on behalf of the NBS).
50 Letter from Gerald R. Young, Deputy Director for Plans and Policy, National
Security Agency, to Director, Institute for Computer Sciences and Technology, Na-
tional Bureau of Standards (June 1987) (on file with Author) (expressing concern that
the Data Encryption Standard could be an attractive intelligence target).
[Vol. 9:253
THE CASE OF CRYPTOGRAPHY
major problem for the international banking industry. The banking
industry also opposed the proposal because it had invested a large
amount of money implementing DES and was concerned about
compatibility.
The NBS ignored the NSA suggestion and reauthorized DES
as an official government standard for another five years. Again,
from an NSA perspective, the controversy must have been consid-
ered successful, as it discouraged many companies from adopting
the standard. Cheryl Helsing of the American Bankers Association
testified: "Our industry has lost valuable momentum in adopting
improved security technology, and it still remains to be seen if we
can overcome the damage that has been done to the perceived se-
curity of DES-based technologies."
Today, DES remains a federal standard, but few believe that it
is secure because of the short key length. In a contest sponsored by
RSA Data Security in January 1999, the Electronic Frontier Foun-
dation, an advocacy group, cracked a DES encrypted message in
twenty-one hours using a combination of a machine built for
$300,000 and a network of computers attached to the Internet. Had
the NSA not interfered with its creation, the standard would have
lasted for at least another twenty years. Now many companies are
using an unapproved version of DES that effectively doubles the
key length until a new national standard is developed.
B. The Digital Signature Standard
A second battle for standards erupted in the early 1990s with
efforts by the National Institute of Standards and Technology to
replace DES with a new algorithm that would provide for encryp-
tion and digital signatures. In 1989, as its first action under the
Computer Security Act, NIST began working on a new public key
encryption standard to protect unclassified, sensitive information
held by government agencies and multinational corporations. This
proposal began in secret under the auspices of a NIST/NSA Tech-
nical Working Group. NIST initially intended to use RSA, a sys-
tem already in wide use by industry, but the NSA opposed the
choice. NSA opposition caused conflicts at the Technical Working
Group (TWG) meetings. At the January 31, 1990 meeting of the
TWG, NIST representatives expressed frustration with the process:
"It's increasingly evident that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile the concerns and requirements of the NSA, NIST, and
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the general public though using this approach." 51 The FBI also be-
gan to pressure NIST. Soon after, FBI representatives joined the
working group.
The NSA and the FBI put intense pressure on NIST to adopt
an NSA-designed system that only provided for signatures. In an
October 19, 1990 memo, the NSA showed its determination to
force NIST to adopt its system: "[NSA Assistant Director] Clint
[Brooks] has agreed to arrange a meeting with [Acting NIST Di-
rector] Ray Kammer to present our entire package .... If Kammer
does not accept our proposal, we will have to consider escalating
the problem. 52 In April 1991, Kammer committed NIST to
adopting the NSA Digital Signature Standard (DSS) proposal. The
FBI was blunt about their success in preventing a confidentiality
standard from being released, describing the DSS as a "stalking
horse for subsequent release of an encryption/interface standard."5
A 1992 memo from FBI Director William Sessions to Attorney
General William Barr trying to gather support for the proposal
stated, "[NIST's] ... efforts in support of a digital signature stan-
dard (the first phase of our strategy to address the encryption is-
sue) must be re-energized., 54
In August 1991, NIST publicly announced the DSS. 55 The role
of the NSA was not uncovered until Computer Professionals for
Social Responsibility initiated a Freedom of Information Act law-
suit against NIST to force disclosure of background documents.5 6
51 Memorandum for the Record from the NIST/NSA Technical Working Group
(Jan. 31, 1990) (on file with Author) (noting concerns expressed during the twelfth
meeting of the TWG).
52 Memorandum from the National Security Agency (Oct. 19, 1990) (discussing
efforts to gain support for the NSA's proposed standards from the NIST). See
SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 305.
53 Memorandum from the Federal Bureau of Investigation entitled Digital Te-
lephony: The Threat and the Issues (Oct. 1, 1994) (discussing the congressional,
digital, and industrial atmosphere surrounding the use of encryption technology and
the effect of the technologies on the ability of the FBI to conduct voice, data, and
image surveillance). Id. at 306.
Memorandum from William Sessions, Director of the Federal Bureau of In-
vestigation, to William Barr, United States Attorney General (May 26, 1992) (dis-
cussing key initiatives in compelling the telecommunication industry to cooperate
with the FBI's proposed digital signal standard). Id. at 208-10.
55 See A Proposed Federal Information Processing Standard for Digital Signa-
ture Standard (DSS), 56 Fed. Reg. 42,980 (1991) (proposing a specified "public-key
based digital signature algorithm (DSA) appropriate for Federal digital signature
applications").
56 See David L. Sobel, Government Restrictions on the Development and Dis-
semination of Cryptographic Technologies: The Controversy over the Digital Signa-
ture Standard, 16 COMPUTER LAW REP. 265, 267-68 (1992) (arguing that the NSA's
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Both the public and various industry groups reacted very nega-
tively to the proposed standard. Over one hundred companies,
trade associations, and individuals submitted comments. Although
many people were encouraged that NIST was finally releasing
something after ten years of inaction, nearly every public comment
opposed the proposed standard. The comments noted a number of
problems, including the lack of privacy protection, incompatibility
with the industry standard RSA algorithm, the NSA role in de-
signing the algorithm, and several technical problems. Even some
government agencies were critical of the standard. The Department
of the Treasury and the IRS threatened to adopt the stronger RSA
system. The Canadian government and the European Community
both filed comments opposing the proposal because of the royalty
agreements.
In May 1994, NIST announced the adoption of the DSS, even
after the overwhelmingly negative comments from the public and
the failure of the hashing algorithm. 58 NIST ignored the criticism,
stating that "NIST considered all of the issues raised and believes
that it has addressed them.' '59
C. The Clipper Chip
The controversy over the Digital Signature Standard did not
end with its adoption. Because the DSS lacked the ability to pro-
vide for confidentiality, an encryption system was still necessary.
While the debate on the Digital Signature Standard went on pub-
licly, the NSA and the FBI continued working behind the scenes
on another proposal to introduce an encryption algorithm to re-
place DES that would protect private communications, but would
allow government agencies to intercept and decrypt communica-
tions. The encryption ability was separated from the signature
function at an early stage in the TWG meetings due to pressure
from the NSA and the FBI.
involvement in the development of DSS is "contrary to Congress' intentions in en-
actinq the Computer Security Act of 1987").
See Letter from Steven Broadbent, Department of Treasury, to James Bur-
rows, NIST (Feb. 4, 1992) (on file with Author).
58 Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 186,
Digital Signature Standard (DSS), 59 Fed. Reg. 26,208 (1994) (announcing that the
Secretary of Commerce approved the Digital Signature Standard as one of the recog-
nized Federal Information Processing Standards due to its "capability to generate
digital signatures that cannot be forged").
5 SCINEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at
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By early 1991, the NSA had formalized its proposal. Accord-
ing to documents, the encryption algorithm, code-named "Skip-
jack," was developed by the NSA in 1985 for classified use. Under
the NSA system, an NSA contractor would produce the chips,
which would then be placed in commercial devices and sold to the
public. The internal encryption key would be split up and handed
over to two government agencies who would give it to intelligence
and law enforcement agencies upon their request. The initiative
was internally code-named "Clipper," a name that later became
public at the insistence of the policymakers who adopted it over
the opposition of the NSA "because they found it so convenient to
use that it stuck."6 A more sophisticated version to be used for
computer communications, called the Capstone Chip, was also de-
veloped.
After the November 1992 election of William J. Clinton, dis-
cussions began immediately to get the new President's approval of
the proposal. For political reasons, the decision to announce was
held back for fear that the incoming administration would reject
the proposal if it were publicly announced before the inauguration.
The NSA and the FBI met with the new administration and other
government agencies to convince them to support the proposal.
The agencies focused their efforts on convincing Vice President Al
Gore who had built a reputation in Congress on high-technology
issues.
The Department of Justice and the NSA pushed manufacturers
to adopt the standard. They expected to create a large enough mar-
ket to make the Clipper a de facto standard.61 AT&T agreed to
support the Clipper Chip and drop its plans to sell its phone en-
cryption device incorporating DES if the Justice Department
agreed to buy 9,000 Clipper-enabled telephone scramblers from
AT&T.
On April 15, 1993, President Clinton signed Presidential De-
60 Letter from Clint Brooks, Special Assistant to the Director of the National
Security Agency (Apr. 20, 1993) (entitled Presidential Encryption Policy, explaining
where the internal encryption key got its name). Id. at 308.
61 See Technology and the Law: Privacy Issues in the Telecommunications In-
dustry, 1994: Hearing on the Administration's "Clipper Chip" Key-Escrow Encryp-
tion Program before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Technology and the Law,
103rd Cong. (1994) (statement of Jo Ann Harris, Assistant Attorney General, Crimi-
nal Division, U.S. Department of Justice) (explaining that, due to the quality and
strength of key-escrow encryption, the Attorney General's office expects the technol-
ogy to be adopted by the private sector).
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cision Directive 5 authorizing the Clipper initiative.62 The directive
ordered the Attorney General to "request manufacturers of com-
munications hardware which incorporates encryption to install the
U.S. Government Developed key-escrow microcircuits in their
products."63 Manufacturers could adopt other systems that were
"equally effective in assuring both privacy and a secure key-
escrow system."' The Attorney General was ordered to determine
the key holders and set out procedures for their release. The De-
partment of Commerce was ordered to begin the standards-setting
process to procure and use the new encryption chip in "federal
communications systems that process sensitive but unclassified
information" within six months of the directive.65 To make it more
palatable to industry, the State Department announced it would
relax export controls on products that contain Clipper Chips while
maintaining controls on other encryption products. In addition, the
NIST announced that it would not reapprove DES in 1998, leaving
Skipjack as the only official government standard for protecting
unclassified information.
The Clipper proposal immediately generated intense public
opposition. A March 1994 Time/CNN poll of 1,000 people found
that eighty percent of the public opposed the Clipper proposal
when it was described to them.66 An electronic petition organized
by Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) ask-
ing President Clinton to withdraw the Clipper proposal gathered
nearly 50,000 signatures, including many of the world's most
prominent computer security and cryptography experts. Dozens of
newspapers across the country wrote editorials against the Clipper
proposal. Syndicated columnist William Safire, writing in the New
York Times noted, "[w]ell-meaning law and intelligence officials,
vainly seeking to maintain their vanishing ability to eavesdrop,
have come up with a scheme that endangers the personal freedom
62 Letter from William J. Clinton, President of the United States of America, on
Public Encryption Management (Apr. 15, 1993) (explaining that the public encryp-
tion management directive, called the Clipper Initiative, would "assist law enforce-
ment and other government agencies to collect and decrypt" legally collected, elec-
tronically transmitted information).
63 SCHNEIER & BANISAR, ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 312.
64 id.
65 id.
66 See Philip Elmer Dewitt, Who Should Keep the Keys?, TIME, Mar. 14, 1993,
at 90 (noting that two-thirds of people polled said "it was more important to protect
the privacy of phone calls than to preserve the ability of police to conduct wire taps").
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of every American." 67 Business Week asked, "[w]ill the Informa-
tion Superhighway enable the federal government to become a
high-tech snoop on a scale undreamt of in George Orwell's worst
nightmares?
68
Surveys of industry and security experts found nearly unani-
mous opposition. In June 1993, the Computer Security System and
Privacy Advisory Board held public hearings on the Clipper and
heard testimony from dozens of corporations, industry associa-
tions, public interest groups, and interested individuals. Nearly all
of the written and oral testimony presented to the Board was criti-
cal of the proposal. The Board recommended that the White House
stop implementation of Clipper until a more extensive review of
the proposal was conducted. Over 300 companies, industry and
professional associations, public interest groups, and individuals
responded to the NIST Federal Register notice asking for public
comments while only two individuals supported the proposal.69
Nearly all the commentators objected to the NSA role in the proc-
ess and the implementation of a system in which the U.S. govern-
ment held the keys. Privacy and security concerns were cited for
the opposition. There was a widespread belief that at some point, a
mandatory system would be imposed. Another major objection of
the commentators was that the Clipper proposal reversed the usual
presumption of open standards settings. For the first time, an NIST
standard for computer security of public computer systems was
totally classified. They also cited its incompatibility with industry
standards such as RSA and the DES.
In February 1994, even after the overwhelming public oppo-
sition, the White House announced that it was formally adopting
the Clipper as a "voluntary" government standard. The White
House acknowledged that the plan was controversial. It brushed
off the overwhelmingly negative comments, stating that since the
standard was voluntary, "the Department of Commerce has found
that notice and comment is unnecessary. '70 NIST Assistant Direc-
67 William Safire, Sink the Clipper Chip, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 14, 1994, at A17
(expressing fear that the federal government will be able to intrude upon the privacy
of every American via the "Clipper Chip").
68 Don't Let Washington Play "I Spy" On You, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 24, 1994, at
126 (asserting that the "Clipper Chip" will give the government enormous snooping
power over American citizens).
69 See Approval of Federal Information Processing Standards Publication 185,
Escrowed Encryption Standard (EES) 59 Fed. Reg. 5,997 (1994) (giving information
concerning the applicability, implementation, and maintenance of the standard, and a
specifications section dealing with the technical requirements).
70 SCHEIER & BANISAR, ELEcTRoNIc PRIVACY PAPERS, supra note 8, at 316.
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tor Kammer stated in a Commerce Department press release that
"[w]hile the vast majority of comments were negative, many re-
flected misunderstanding of skepticism about the administration's
statements that the EES would be a voluntary standard., 71 The
public comments reflecting concerns about privacy were also
summarily rejected. "The Department of Justice has assured NIST
that the Escrowed Encryption Standard is fully consistent with
protection of individual privacy rights. 72 One Congressional staf-
fer summed up the process as "a cynical sham given the outcome
was predetermined by PDD-5" and suggested that the process was
''apparently pointless except to occupy the public while they [the
NSA] deployed the technology., 73
Overall, the Clipper Chip was a spectacular failure. Only a
handful were sold outside the Justice Department order. AT&T
shut down its product line and laid off its workers because of the
lack of sales and now only sells a non-escrow device based on a
proprietary algorithm. Even many of the AT&T devices bought by
the Justice Department reportedly sit unused in a warehouse. A
similar fate befell the Capstone Chip, which was incorporated into
smart cards, but was also widely rejected.
D. Clipper With a Happy Face: Key Escrow and Key Recovery
With the failure of hardware-based key escrow systems, the
NSA and NIST began wooing companies to develop a software
encryption system that would provide the same access to keys as
that by government agencies. The approach, called key escrow or
key recovery, emphasized that the keys would be held by a
"trusted third party" instead of a government agency and that the
software would be designed by industry, rather than by the NSA.
Industry was also encouraged to use the system because it would
allow users to recover keys in case of accidents.
This approach was first introduced in an April 1994 letter
from Vice President Al Gore to Congresswoman Maria Cantwell
(D-WA) reaffirming the administration's position on key escrow
encryption. 74 In July 1996, Vice President Gore officially an-
nounced the administration's software key escrow policy. 75 Under
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.74 Id. at 319.
75 Administration Statement on Commercial Encryption Policy, July 12, 1996,
(visited June 10, 1999) <http://www.epic.org/crypto/keyescrow/wh_cke_796.html>
1999] 275
HEALTH MATRIX
the Gore announcement, a "framework based on a global key man-
agement infrastructure that supports digital signatures and confi-
dentiality" would be implemented.76 The proposal called for the
encryption key to be "provided voluntarily by a computer user to a
trusted party who holds it for safe keeping."" Export controls on
software that used these parties would be relaxed. The administra-
tion stated that a growing consensus toward key escrow was
emerging. The proposal was for a "voluntary" system but under
various legal pressures, the end result would be to ban all indi-
viduals from the network who refused to give their keys to the
certification/escrow authority. 78 Again, companies that made ac-
ceptable key escrow software would be allowed to export their
software.79
Today, software key escrow is suffering the same fate as the
Clipper Chip. Only a small market has emerged for the products.
Virtually no individuals and few companies trust a third party to
control their keys. International consensus is against escrow.80
Government efforts to subvert standards to prevent the prolif-
eration of cryptography have been partially successful. The DES
was weakened and is now no longer usable for protecting informa-
tion of any level of sensitivity. The Digital Signature Standard is
used by some companies, but it is incompatible with industry stan-
dards and its lack of a confidentiality function limits its use. The
Clipper Chip is dead, but key escrow remains a main component of
policy. The uncertainty caused by these battles has prevented the
adoption of a single, strong system that can be used across many
systems.
IV. STRATEGY 3: EXPORT CONTROLS
A third tactic used by the U.S. government to limit cryptogra-
(explaining the importance of an encryption policy to the federal government and
describing the value of the key recovery system of encryption).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 id.
79 Bruce W. McConnell & Edward J. Appel, Executive Office of the President,
Office of Management and Budget, Memorandum for Interested Parties (visited Apr.
9, 1999) <http:llwww.epic.orglcryptolkey-escrow/whitepaper.html> (providing a
draft paper entitled Enabling Privacy, Commerce, Security and Public Safety in the
Global Information Infrastructure, which proposes export controls on key escrow
software).
80 See Cryptography and Liberty 1998: An International Survey of Encryp-
tion Policy, (Feb. 1998) (visited Aug. 27, 1999) <http://www.gilc.org/crypto/
crypto-survey.html>.
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phy both domestically and internationally has been imposing ex-
port controls on software and hardware that incorporate encryp-
tion. These are used to drive domestic policy by promoting prod-
ucts such as escrow, allowing their export and discouraging devel-
opment of strong encryption by making it difficult to sell it over-
seas. The NSA has significant power over approvals on the export
of cryptography. As noted by the General Accounting Office in
1993:
NSA plays a major role in determining rules for exporting
U.S. products with encryption capabilities. The scope of
NSA's review is generally limited to those products and
technologies whose export could affect the performance of
NSA missions. The review affects such decisions as (1)
whether individual products are placed on the more re-
strictive State-controlled "munitions list" or the less re-
strictive Commerce-controlled list and (2) whether par-
ticular products on the munitions list may be licensed for
export.
81
Since then, the rules have changed but the NSA is still in control.
Export controls reduce the availability of encryption in com-
mon programs such as operating systems, electronic mail, and
word processors, especially from American companies. Companies
are reluctant to develop two different product lines, one for do-
mestic use that contains strong encryption and an international ver-
sion with weaker encryption. The restrictions also make it difficult
to develop international standards for encryption and inter-
operability of different programs. Countries must develop their
own local programs which do not inter-operate well if at all with
other programs developed independently in other countries. They
may not be as secure because of a lack of peer-review. Companies
and individuals are not as interested in developing programs be-
cause of smaller potential profits due to smaller markets.
U.S. export control rules are enforced by the U.S. Department
of Commerce. The Export Administration Regulations (EAR) set
forth comprehensive controls on exports of non-military com-
modities and information from the United States.82 To export
81 Communications Privacy - Federal Policy and Actions, supra note 47, at 3-4.
82 The Regulations were originally promulgated by authority of the Export Ad-
ministration Act (EAA), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-2420 (1991). The EAA has lapsed
and has not been reenacted by Congress. The provisions of both the EAA and the
Export Administration Regulations (EAR) have been kept in force since 1994 by
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strong encryption software and technology anywhere except Can-
ada, the exporter must first apply for and receive an individual li-
cense from the Commerce Department. Prior to 1986, encryption
software and technology was controlled by the U.S. Department of
State under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR)
where they were considered as munitions, and treated in the same
way as machine guns or tanks.
"Export" is defined expansively under the Export Admini-
stration Regulations to include not only "actual shipment or trans-
mission ... out of the United States" or "release of technology or
software in a foreign country" but also transfers or disclosures that
take place entirely within the United States.13 For encryption soft-
ware, "export" includes making the software available on Internet
sites or any other "communications facilities" that are merely ac-
cessible to persons outside the United States, unless certain oner-
ous precautions are taken." The discretion of the government to
grant or deny the license is essentially unbounded. The Regula-
tions provide only that "applications will be reviewed on a case-
by-case basis" by the Commerce Department, in conjunction with
several other agencies, to determine whether the export or reexport
"is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy inter-
ests. '8 5 No definite time for a final decision is established, and ju-
dicial review is apparently unavailable. 6
The controls on encryption have generated considerable con-
troversy. American industry has strongly opposed the restrictions,
citing the loss of hundreds of millions of dollars in sales to foreign
competitors who offer similar products without restrictions. The
National Research Council found in 1991 that, "[i]f the United
States does not allow vendors of commercial systems to export
security products and products with relatively effective security
features, large multi-national firms as well as foreign consumers
will simply purchase equivalent systems from foreign manufactur-
executive orders exercising the President's emergency powers under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-06. See 63 Fed. Reg.
44,121 (1998) (continuing the state of national emergency declared by President
Clinton due to the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, and the fail-
ure by Congress to renew it). Exec. Order No. 12924, 59 Fed. Reg. 43,437 (1994)
(continuing the export control regulations against unrestricted foreign parties in light
of the expiration of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as amended).
83 Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. § 734.2 (b)(1).
'4 Id. § 734.2(b)(9)(ii).
85 Id. § 742.15(b).
86 See id.
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ers."8 7 Indeed, many computer companies such as Network Asso-
ciates, the producer of Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), and RSA Data
Security, have set up foreign subsidiaries to sell encryption prod-
ucts worldwide.
In the past several years, the controls have led to several con-
troversial cases over the abusive application of export controls to
harass and to restrict free speech. In 1991, activist Phil Zimmer-
mann released a free program called "Pretty Good Privacy" (PGP),
which used the RSA algorithm for key exchange and a Swiss-
designed algorithm, the International Data Encryption Algorithm,
for encryption. Zimmermann wrote the program in response to the
introduction of Senate Bill 266." One of the users placed PGP on
the Internet, making it available worldwide. Shortly after its re-
lease, a federal prosecutor in San Jose, California began investi-
gating Zimmermann for violating the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (ITAR). Subpoenas were filed with companies that
sold PGP and several members of the Internet activist community
were questioned by the grand jury or by the prosecutors. Often
they made the questions public, infuriating the prosecutor. The
investigation dragged on for three years, prompting many to sug-
gest that it was politically motivated to harass Zimmermann and
prevent him from releasing new versions of his software. The in-
vestigation was finally dropped without comment in January 1996.
The NSA has also used such controls to threaten manufacturers
into modifying their products. According to the employees at the
National Center for Supercomputing Applications, the NSA ap-
proached them in June 1995 and told them to remove the links for
PGP and other encryption programs from the publicly available
versions of Mosaic, a popular Internet browsing program. In 1996,
NSA officials visited Sun Microsystems demanding they limit the
security features of the new Java language.
89
There are three constitutional challenges to the export control
rules. Thus far, one federal court has ruled that export controls
violate the First Amendment. All three cases are pending and it
87 SYSTEM SECURITY STUDY COMM'N., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL,
COMPUTERS AT RISK IN THE INFORMATION AGE 37 (1991) (clarifying export control
criteria).
88 Comprehensive Counterterrorism Improvement Act of 1991, supra note 23,
at § 2201.
89 See Ellen Messmer, Sun to Feds: Keep Your Paws Off Java, NETWORK
WORLD, June 3, 1996, at 1, 15 (explaining why the NSA objects to the exportation of
Sun's JavaSoft division technology, and why Sun believes the technology requires
additional security features).
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seems likely that the U.S. Supreme Court will make the final deci-
sion.
In February 1994, Phil Karn, an engineer from San Diego, ap-
plied for permission to export a treatise on cryptography entitled
Applied Cryptography.' The request was granted by the State De-
partment. When Karn applied to export the disk-based, electronic
version a month later, the State Department denied the request,
basing their decision on the rationale that ease of implementing the
disk version made it different from the book. The author of the
treatise, Bruce Schneier, believes that the basis for their decision
can probably be attributed to the fact that "foreigners can't type."
91
Karn filed suit in September 1995. In March 1996, the U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Washington, D.C. dismissed the case, ruling that it
was a "political question" which should be decided by the execu-
tive branch and Congress.92 The court denied Karn's constitutional
challenge, ruling that the regulations were "content neutral" and
therefore did not infringe on free speech rights.93 The D.C. Court
of Appeals sent the decision back to the District Court following
the 1996 changes to the export laws and it is in discovery phase
now.94 On February 18, 1999, Judge Louis Oberdorfer granted
Plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing.95
A second case filed against the regulations came out with a
different decision. In 1995, a University of California Ph.D. math
student, Dan Bernstein, filed suit against the State Department and
the NSA, challenging the constitutionality of the ITAR. Bernstein
had applied for permission to export a cryptosystem he had in-
vented called Snuffle which modified the Digital Signature Stan-
90 See ScHNEiER, supra note I.
91 The Applied Cryptography Case: Only Americans Can Type (visited June 16,
1999) <http://people.qualcomm.comkam/export/index.html>.
92 Memorandum Opinion of Charles R. Richey United States District Court
Judge, (visited June 16, 1999), <http://people.qualcomm.com/karn/export/richey-
dec-ision.html>.
93 Kam v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F. Supp. 1, 9-11 (D. D.C. 1996)
(holding that the government did not regulate the export of Karn's diskette because of
its content, but rather was acting to prevent foreign intelligence sources from encod-
ing the information). Because the rationale for the regulation was held to be content-
neutral, the court did not presume it to be invalid. Id. Instead, the court determined
that the regulation was justifiable as vital to national security interests.
94 Kam v. United States Dep't of State, No. 96-5121, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS
3123, at 2-3 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 21, 1997) (remanding the case "[iun light of the recent
Executive Order transferring regulatory authority of non-military cryptographic com-
puter source code to the Commerce Department, and the Commerce Department's
promulgation of a new regulation").
95 See The Applied Cryptography Case, supra note 91.
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dard to provide privacy protection. He also wanted to export ac-
companying documentation. Bernstein submitted a request with
the State Department for a determination about whether the pro-
gram and the documentation were controlled under ITAR, thus
limiting him from publishing information about the program. After
several months, the State Department ruled that nothing, including
several non-technical papers, could be exported. Bernstein filed
suit in 1995 challenging the constitutionality of the decision.
The State Department argued their rules regulated conduct,
like the burning of draft cards, not speech, and therefore did not
involve the First Amendment. In a substantially different analysis
from the Karn decision, Judge Marilyn Patel initially ruled that the
source code was protected by the First Amendment. Judge Patel
ruled that, "[t]his court can find no meaningful difference between
computer language, particularly high-level languages as defined
above, and German or French .... Like music and mathematical
equations, computer language is just that, language, and it commu-
nicates information either to a computer or to those who can read
it.' ' 96 The Judge ruled that the case could continue and upheld the
preliminary decision in August 1997. The government appealed,
and the case is now pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit.
In a third case, Peter Junger, a law professor at Case Western
Reserve University Law School, proposed to include on his class
information Web site the source code for "Fiddle," a software pro-
gram he wrote, and also some other programs. Because the source
code for each program included mathematical algorithms useful
for encrypting information, in June 1997 Junger asked the Com-
merce Department for permission to make them available. The
Commerce Department ruled that placing the programs on his Web
site was considered to be an export and required their permission,
which they then denied. Junger filed suit in September 1997 in the
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, arguing that the
restrictions on publication of encryption software violated the First
Amendment. The district court granted judgment to the govern-
ment ruling that "[e]xport Regulations are constitutional because
encryption source code is inherently functional, because the Export
Regulations are not directed at source code's expressive elements,
96 Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F. Supp. 1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal.
1996) (finding that cryptographic computer code is a form of protected free speech
and that government regulations restricting the use of this code could be challenged
on a constitutional basis).
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and because the Export Regulations do not reach academic discus-
sions of software, or software in print form." 97 Junger has appealed
the case and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit will
hear oral arguments in a few months.
Moved by the reports of industry losses and lax security on
the Internet, Congress has tried several times to relax the export
controls. Each time they have faced considerable opposition from
the White House and the NSA. However, each year that the pro-
posals are introduced, they gain progressively more support.
98
The Internet has significantly changed the effectiveness of
export controls. Strong, unbreakable encryption programs can now
be delivered in seconds to anywhere in the world from anywhere in
the world with a network connection. It has been increasingly dif-
ficult for countries to limit dissemination, and once a program is
released, it is nearly impossible to stop its redissemination, espe-
cially if it is in one of the many countries around the world with no
export controls.
V. STRATEGY 4: POLICY LAUNDERING:
INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESTRICT
ENCRYPTION
Over the past several years, the role of international organiza-
tions has become crucial in the development of encryption poli-
cies. These include the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD), the European Union, NATO, the G-
7/G-8, the Council of Europe, and the Wassenaar Arrangement. In
all of these, the United States, with the support of the government
of the United Kingdom, and occasionally the French and Austra-
lian governments, has led efforts to gain international support for
restrictions. Opposition to their efforts has been led by Germany
and the Scandinavian countries.
The United States has demanded that other countries adopt
restrictions on cryptography, even though these restrictions are not
supported in the United States. Using these proposed restrictions,
the U.S. government has lobbied Congress for new domestic re-
97 Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (holding that com-
puter encryption software export regulations were constitutional because the export
of encryption software source code was not sufficiently expressive to merit First
Amendment protection).
98 See generally Internet Privacy Coalition, Latest News (last modified Feb. 1,
1999) <http://www.crypto.org/> (providing current events page designed to "promote
privacy and security on the Internet through widespread public availability of strong
encryption and the relaxation of export controls on cryptography").
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strictions, arguing that the rest of the world is adopting restric-
tions, so the United States must do so, too, to ensure that its laws
are compatible. For the most part the United States has been un-
successful in this effort. This has obviously been a clever effort at
policy laundering.
A. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
In 1995, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), a Paris-based international body of twenty-
nine countries, began work on developing cryptography guide-
lines. The OECD had previously developed well-respected guide-
lines on the privacy of personal information and computer secu-
rity. The United States began pressuring the OECD to adopt key
escrow and domestic restrictions as an international standard.
Shortly after the OECD began the process, the key staff member
who was the only person in the organization familiar with cryptog-
raphy was mysteriously forced out and replaced with a junior at-
torney who had no experience in the subject. A U.S. Department of
Justice attorney was also placed in the OECD to help develop the
guidelines. The OECD also changed their previous traditional two-
year process of consensus to a one-year accelerated process that
included a "core group," led by the U.S. government, who were
there to write the guidelines. At the meetings, the U.S. delegation,
which was led by the Justice Department, the FBI, and the NSA,
began to lobby the committee to adopt key escrow.
The OECD was severely divided by the proposals. The U.S.
position was supported by France and the United Kingdom. The
Japanese government, represented by their Ministry of Trade, was
strongly opposed. The Scandinavian countries also announced that
they were unhappy with the proposals, stating that the system
would undermine trust. Denmark's representative announced that
key escrow would not be included in a nation-wide card system.
Industry representatives wanted to ensure that they would have the
right to adopt any system of their choosing. The Canadian and
Australian delegations demanded that a privacy principle be in-
cluded.
In March 1997, the OECD issued its Guidelines on Cryptog-
raphy Policy. The OECD Recommendation is a non-binding
agreement that identifies the basic issues that countries should
consider in drawing up cryptography policies at the national and
international level. The OECD recommended that while govern-
ments may restrict encryption, they must take the basic principles
of privacy and human rights into account before imposing restric-
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tions. Since their adoption, many countries such as Ireland, Fin-
land, and Canada have issued new cryptography policies without
restrictions." France reversed its previous restrictive policy in
January 1999.1°
B. G7/G8
The Group of 8 (G-8) is made up of the heads of state of the
top eight industrialized countries in the world."' The leaders have
been meeting annually since 1975 to discuss issues of importance,
including the information highway, crime, and terrorism.
In 1996, the United States began pressuring the G-7/G-8 to
address cryptography. At their meeting in Lyon, France in 1996,
the G-8 agreed to "[a]ccelerate consultations, in appropriate bilat-
eral or multilateral fora, on the use of encryption that allows, when
necessary, lawful government access to data and communications
in order to, inter alia, prevent or investigate acts of terrorism,
while protecting the privacy of legitimate communications."'' 02
At the Denver Summit in June 1997, they decided "[t]o coun-
ter, inter alia, the use of strong encryption by terrorists, we have
endorsed acceleration of consultations and adoption of the OECD
guidelines for cryptography policy and invited all states to develop
national policies on encryption, including key, management, which
may allow, consistent with these guidelines, lawful government
access to prevent and investigate acts of terrorism and to find a
mechanism to cooperate internationally in implementing such
policies."
At the Birmingham, England meeting in May 1998, the G-8
Ministers adopted a recommendation on ten principles and a ten-
point action plan on high-tech crime that did not explicitly mention
99 See generally Global Internet Liberty Campaign, Cryptography and Liberty:
An International Survey of Encryption Policy (visited Apr. 9, 1999) <http:llwww.
gilc.org/crypto/crypto-results.html> (providing results of a survey of countries' poli-
cies regarding controls and cryptogrtaphy).
1OO See Interministerial Committee on the Information Society (CISI) - January
19, 1999: Decisions Taken (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.premier-ministre.
gouv.fr/GB/INFO/FICHE1GB.HTM> (outlining a number of new dispositions on
encryption and protection of personal data presented to Parliament by the French
government).
101 The Group of Eight (G-8) is made up of the following countries: Canada,
France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United States, and the
European Commission.
102 Electronic Privacy Information Center, G7-G8, Ministerial Conference
on Terrorism, Paris, July 30, 1996 (visited Aug. 31, 1999) <http://www.epic.org/
privacy/terrorism/g7_resolutions.html>, at 11.
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encryption. The ministers announced:
We call for close cooperation with industry to reach
agreement on a legal framework for obtaining, presenting,
and preserving electronic data as evidence, while main-
taining appropriate privacy protection, and agreements on
sharing evidence of those crimes with international part-
ners. This will help us combat a wide range of crime, in-
cluding abuse of the internet and other new technolo-
gies. 10
3
C. The Wassenaar Arrangement
The United States has been somewhat successful in promoting
restrictions though the extension of export controls. The main in-
ternational agreement on export controls is the Wassenaar Ar-
rangement. The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) is an agreement by
a group of thirty-three industrialized countries' °4 to restrict the ex-
port of conventional weapons and "dual use" technology to certain
other countries considered pariah states or, in some cases, those
who are at war. Certain cryptographic products, along with other
technology such as supercomputers and high-level computer secu-
rity access software, are considered to be "dual use" in that they
can be used for both commercial and military purposes.
The WA representatives largely represent the law enforce-
ment, signals intelligence, and weapons control sectors of partici-
pant governments and have little appreciation for commercial or
privacy concerns. The WA countries maintain export controls for
the items on the agreed Control Lists, which are reviewed periodi-
cally to take into account technological developments. Decisions
to amend the Control Lists, as with all WA decisions, are made by
consensus, i.e., they must be unanimous. Participating states corn-
103 G-8 Communique, (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.gilc.org/crypto/g7/g8-
birmingham-598.html> (summarizing the May 18, 1998 G-8 Meeting in Birming-
ham, England, which focused on economic growth and combating crime through the
use of technological tools).
104 Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Repub-
lic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Republic
of Korea, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. See Was-
senaar Export Control Regime (visited Mar. 25, 1999) <http://www.fas.orglspp/
starwars/offdocs/s960712.htm> (reporting on the establishment of a new system to
monitor and control exports of conventional arms and dual-use technologies).
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mit to adjust their national export control policies to adhere to the
WA Control Lists, but this commitment is discretionary in nature
and is not mandatory. Participating States may adjust their crypto-
graphic export policies through new regulations or legislation.
On December 3, 1998, the Wassenaar Secretariat announced
that new cryptography guidelines had been added to the Arrange-
ment. The Wassenaar Dual-Use Control List was extended to cover
mass market software that contained encryption such as Web
browsers, e-mail applications, electronic commerce servers, and
telephone scrambling devices with strengths over 64-bits. These
controls must be renewed and approved unanimously in two years,
otherwise they will be canceled. The Wassenaar countries also
agreed to control other software, for example, the kind that is used
in specific sectors such as banking, insurance, and health - at the
56-bit level.
However, the United States did not get everything it wanted.
According to a press release from the German Ministry of Econ-
omy, "[c]ertain states that had initially demanded special treatment
for 'key recovery' products have not been successful. Thus, the
export of encryption technology will remain possible without de-
positing keys with government agencies." Most importantly, and in
what constitutes an important "loophole," the new WA controls do
not apply to the "intangible" distribution of cryptography, includ-
ing downloads from the Internet.
It remains to be seen what the effects will actually be on the
flow of encryption products. Several countries such as Canada and
Germany have indicated that they do not plan to impose new strict
restrictions on exports of mass-market software. The Swiss gov-
ernment wrote:
The upcoming minor revisions to Switzerland's export
controls on cryptographic goods as a result of the Decem-
ber '98 changes to the Wassenaar Arrangement Lists of
controlled goods and technology will not alter the liberal
Swiss Cryptography Policy .... Switzerland will keep its
efficient export permit process for cryptographic goods in
order to encourage Swiss exporters to increase their sales
and share worldwide while being mindful of national secu-
rity interests. 10 5
105 Letter from Bernard Jaggy, First Secretary (Economic Affairs), Embassy of
Switzerland, to Wayne Madsen, EPIC (Jan. 27, 1999) (on file with author) (providing
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VI. CONCLUSION
The efforts by the U.S. government over the last twenty years
to stunt the widespread deployment of encryption both inside and
outside of the United States have been successful. However, their
effectiveness is now running out. Many factors are pushing in the
opposite direction: the increased publicity because of the Clipper
Chip and Digital Signature Standards prevents the adoption of
more secret standards and any new proposal receives intense scru-
tiny; the increasing pressure by industry for adequate security for
electronic commerce, and the globalization of trade make domestic
controls increasingly tenuous. A ubiquitous international key es-
crow scheme has been rejected by other countries and the Internet
effectively ends the use of export controls. The battle will continue
for the foreseeable future because the stakes are too high for eve-
ryone, but the end of the era of crypto restrictions is near.
information on Switzerland's revised import/export controls on cryptographic goods
in response to a request to update the 1998 report Cryptography and Liberty).
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